Nine perspectives on the intrapreneur as an insider threat

Risk is acknowledged as a salient or even inherent feature of innovation and exploration in organizations¹²³. However, the risks’ nature and consequences are often less explored than other features of intrapreneurship and intra-organizational innovation.

In fact, my main reason for starting this blog is to find more research on the risks involved in intrapreneurship and how they can be understood.

Below, I have compiled nine different conceptual frameworks – or perspectives – that might facilitate the understanding of the intrapreneur as an insider threat.

Before we proceed, I would like to define the two most central terms:
Insider threat: ”Someone who, through authorized access to an organization’s resources, has the potential to negatively affect the organization, its purpose and/or its stakeholders, and risk doing so.”
Intrapreneurs: ”People who use their entrepreneurial spirit for the benefit of their employers, and whilst supported by sponsors higher up in their organization also tend to evade their organizations’ control systems and/or resource management to achieve their missions.”

So, to be clear, insider threats – in my definition – need not be harmful or malicious to pose a threat.

Also, as this is part of my thesis work in intelligence analysis, I am particularly interested in how these questions apply to the intelligence services in general and more specifically to the U.S. intelligence community (USIC). Later, I’ll explore Intellipedia as a typical case of intrapreneurship in this context.

Before and after each presentation of a perspective, you’ll see my personal comments on how this perspective relate to the question of intrapreneurs in a grey box.

As a short guide to the nine perspectives, here are a short summary:

Personal risk vs. organizational risk
Here, four potential approaches to risks in intrapreneurial ventures are explored.

Negative spillover: Brain drain
This was the only negative spillover from intrapreneurship that I could find any elaborate research on: how intrapreneurs might be recruited by competing organizations, how that risk might be mitigated legally and the potential consequences of such legal measures.

Information security – a compromise
As I investigate the USIC and the intelligence sharing platform Intellipedia, this is a central question. However, I would argue that the perspective offered here is applicable to most intrapreneurial ventures, even if the relevance is particularly strong for intelligence services.

Ambidextrous organizations and shadow innovation
The balance between exploration (innovation) and exploitation in organization can be described as an ambidextrous act. In this section, I describe how recent findings suggest that the balance is not (entirely) in the two hands of upper management but enacted through shadow innovation (exploration) and efficiency creep (exploitation) in lower levels of the organization.

Evasive entrepreneurship
I suggest some parallells between the concepts of (threatening) evasive entrepreneurship and shadow innovation or ”intrapreneurship after dark”.

Transformational intrapreneurship
Intrapreneuring might be regarded as an existential threat by incumbent players in an organization if its effects are transformational. In studying how adoption of digital tools transforms organizations (and how organizations transform to enable such tools), such a threat perception might be better understood.

Employee Deviance in organizations
Intrapreneuring are more or less ”behavioral departures from norms of a reference group”, a definition of employee deviance. This, in turn, is more or less the definition of the insider threat of ”counterproductive work behaviors” (CWB). Here, a way to distinguish between constructive and destructive deviance is offered.

Tactical-level subcultures
Intrapreneurial behaviour in war – i.e. deviations from rules of engagement or other protocol to achieve a tactical advantages – is explained as a form of street-level bureaucracy depending on tactical-level subcultures. This concept might also be applicable under less chaotic circumstances than the fog of war.

Ethics of Espionage
Finally, some industry-specific deliberations on right and wrong are considered for guidance on how to assess whether intrapreneurial transgressions are justified or not.

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Personal risk vs. organizational risk

Intrapreneurship is pitched to employees ”as a way to capture the creativity and excitement of entrepreneurship, albeit with more resources and less risk”⁴. But are intrapreneurs really less prone to put themselves at risk than their organization and its assets, or more so compared to entrepreneurs? Whilst this study fails to answer that question, it does contribute with several useful ways to understand and explain intrapreneurships relations to risk.

Recognizing that risk is ”an inherent characteristic of innovativeness”⁵, Bostjan Antoncic – a prolific publisher of research on intrapreneuring – investigated Risk taking in intrapreneurship: Translating the individual level risk aversion into the organizational risk taking (2003). He proposed a method for examining his question ”how is it possible that risk averse individuals act in such a way that an organization exercises risk taking behavior in terms of intrapreneurship” based on four ”congruent and complementary”⁶ theories around information processing (and excisting intrapreneurship literature):

1. Theory of planned behavior: Individuals base their decisions on salient beliefs.
2. Prospect theory: Individuals base their decisions on perceptions of information.
3. Agency theory: Individuals base their decisions on information availability related to financial relationships in their organizations.
4. Organizational culture perspective: Individuals base their decisions on information availability related to non-financial relationships in their organizations.

Antoncic concluded that his model shows that:

risk taking propensity as a general enduring psychological characteristic tends not to impact context specific risk-related cognitions and behaviours

Bostjan Antoncic, ”Risk taking in intrapreneurship: Translating the individual level risk aversion into the organizational risk taking”⁷

In essence, a careful person needn’t be careful in all situations.

Antoncic opens for the possibility that the premise for his article is not to be found: ”A radical conclusion […] might be that the risk paradox does not exist, since it apparently disappeared through the conceptual analysis”, but suggests the “more moderate explanation, that seems more plausible” that there is indeed a paradox, but that it doesn’t disturbe or harm organizational life or performance.

Antoncic recognizes that his approach (as its underlying theories) stipulate that individuals are ”relatively rational decision-makers in bounds of available information that shapes their cognitions and in turn their behaviours”⁸.

The question of organizational risk vs. personal risk is very interesting from an insider threat-perspective. However, the premise of this thesis might not that relevant to study the insider threat-perspective. Whether or not there is, generally, a paradox between organizational risk taking propensity and personal risk aversion is – to me – less relevant than the perception of organizational risk taking. However, as Antoncic notes, one can argue that ”risk taking behavior basically resides at the level of an individual even if it is finally translated into the firm’s risk taking behavior”. The fact that the paradox does not seem to be ”disturbing and harmful for organizational life and performance” might, if it stands, suggest that is doesn’t matter that much.

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Negative spillover: Brain drain

Since this is the only example I have found that explicitly adresses a threat from intrapreneurship, this contribution a given item on my list of concepts and conceptual frameworks:

Law Professor Mirit Eyal-Cohen⁹ has explored the negative spillovers of intrapreneurial activities by “Innovation Agents“. She identified the loss of intrapreneurial talent and intellectual property either to incumbent competitors or new ventures, and the subsequent restrictive and wasteful arrangements to mitigate such risks, as potential negative spillovers of intrapreneurial firms.

This perspective is perhaps most interesting from a recruitment opportunity perspective for intelligence services. Apart from the threat of loosing resources like competence when employees leave an organization, an embittered intrapreneur could perhaps be recruited to a competing organization or state. To a host organization, managing expectations, needs and failures of intrapreneurs could be a matter of security. To a competing actor, areas of conflict around failed or threatening intrapreneurial ventures might present opportunities. Also, the fact that Bulmash & Winokur¹⁰ didn’t mention Eyal-Cohen in their article, might serve as proof that the research field of intrapreneurship is still fragmented. Bulmash & Winokur linked intrapreneurship opportunities with employers to lower employee turnover intention.

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Information Security – a compromise

Information security is one feature of the U.S. Intelligence Community identified as competing with intrapreneurial endeavours. It is specifically relevant to the Intellipedia case as well.

Javorsek et al.¹¹ recognized that ”the scientific advantage upon which U.S. military dominance relies” is threatened by the costs of compartmentalization. Javorsek et al.¹² identifies four major repercussions with ”over-compartmentalization” of knowledge:

1. Intelligence consumers must rely on sub-optimal intelligence products for foreign policy decisions, as analysts are denied access to compartmented information.
2. Resources are wasted on parallel but independent development projects.
3. It limits the collective intellectual ability for problem solving.
4. It inhibits communication between the tactical and strategic level, preventing effective knowledge sharing during development and employment.  

Quoting Kitrosser¹³, Javorsek et al. recognizes that ”security compartmentalization has both costs and associated benefits”. The candor argument brought forward by Kitrosser¹⁴ – that secrecy can further openness since ”candor may more likely emerge in a closed, confidential conversation than in a public one” – is seemingly ignored by Javorsek et al. when they conclude that compartmentalization equals ”increasing costs in research and development”¹⁵. It’s worth noting that Kitrosser’s article addresses congressional oversight of national security activities, and not intra-organzational development per se. One might assume that Javorsek et al. considers the candor-argument less applicable to technological R&D than intelligence analysis and intelligence operations, the fact that increased psychological safety affects team learning behavior¹⁶ aside. Kitrosser also concludes that ”The purpose and utility of funneling have been under-explored, and funneling’s propriety and implications thus are poorly understood.”¹⁷.

The conflict between information sharing and information security is old but accentuated by digitalization. In the case of Intellipedia, it’s been central.

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Shadow innovation – intrapreneuring after dark

In defining an insider threat as someone who, through authorized access to an organization’s resources, has the potential to negatively affect that organization, its purpose and/or its stakeholders (and risk doing so), I want to highlight that a conflict about scarce resources may not only be a competition for the use of such resources, but also a conflict around the consequences of using them. The conceptual framework around ”Ambidextrous organizations” and particularly the concepts of ”efficiency creep” and ”shadow innovation” can be useful to understand the integration of information security, and information resource management/enactment.

Since the early 1990s, one popular approach to study and describe the balance between innovation and efficiency within organizations has been the notion of ”Ambidextrous organizations”: where exploration is handled with one hand and exploitation with the other. March¹⁸ concluded that ”Both exploration and exploitation are essential for organizations, but they compete for scarce resources”. 

More recently, Magnusson, Koutsikouria & Päivärinta¹⁹ found in studying IT governance in the Swedish Tax Authority (Skatteverket) a ”substantial misalignment of the tactical vs. the strategic and operative layers”. Whereas the strategic intent and the actual outcome aligned fairly well, project goals set by middle management all but eradicated exploration in favour of exploitation.The authors explained this as enactment (rather than management or design) of ambidextrous IT Governance, where ”efficiency creep” in the middle layer is balanced by ”shadow innovation” in the bottom layer in the organization’s hierarchy.

This could indicate that there is indeed need for exploration intent to ”go through the ‘clay layer’ of middle managers who are usually driven so hard to achieve short-term goals in established systems that they have no time for new ideas”, as Pinchot & Soltanifar suggests²⁰.

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Evasive entrepreneurship

A related field of research is that of evasive entrepreneurship. This pertains to companies’ relations to societies.

We define evasive entrepreneurship as profit-driven business activity in the market aimed at circumventing the existing institutional framework by using innovations to exploit contradictions in that framework.

Niklas Elert & Magnus Henrekson²¹

(A complementary definition, one that I joted down and now can’t find the source of, is ”it’s when a company circumvents a society’s institutional framework (by exploiting regulatory vacuum, vagueness or incompetence) in order to achieve its goals.”)

Giving a number of examples, Elert & Henrekson concludes that while evasive entrepreneurship can be either productive, unproductive or destructive, it can also challenge status quo through disruption.

Just this April, US libertarian think tank Cato Institute published a paperback in praise of evasive entrepreneurship, but these thoughts aren’t new – overt evasion has been labeled and studied as corporate disobedience²², for example.

As observations and findings on evasive intrapreneurship or corporate civil disobedience might, at least in some cases, translate to intrapreneurs’ relations to their organizations, this could be a rewarding field to explore for someone interested in intrapreneurial shadow innovation(i.e. unsanctioned innovation activities²³). One can be tempted to use a term like ”Evasive intrapreneurship” to describe shadow innovation. That might be a tautology though. Pinchot, who coined the term intrapreneur, recognized that intrapreneurs ”routinely bootleg company resources or ‘steal’ company time to work on their own missions”²⁴.

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Transformational intrapreneurship

This conceptual framework can help understand the effects of intrapreneurship, and how a digital intrapreneurial venture can threaten existing organizational life. Digital transformation is particularly relevant in contemporary research of intelligence services as ”It is only a small exaggeration to say that software has eaten just about everything in the [U.S. intelligence community]”²⁵.

Hinings, Gegenhuber & Greenwood²⁶ recognizes that digital transformation – ”the combined effects of several digital innovations bringing about novel actors (and actor constellations), structures, practices, values, and beliefs” – can threaten the existing ”rules of the game” in and for organizations. However, they also question the idea of total disruption, and suggest that existing literature on institutional change rather suggests that if and how new arrangements are accepted depend on already existing institutional arrangements.

Hinings, Gegenhuber & Greenwood, in citing Bitektine²⁷ and Suchman²⁸ among others, recognizes that both accommodation marketplace Airbnb and crowdsourcing platform GalaxyZoo (now Zoouniverse) were accepted by existing institutions because they were developed and promoted ”using language that aligned them with […] organizations/industries that already had legitimacy”²⁹. They propose that radical digital transformers, to be successful, seek legitimacy through and in the institutions that they challenge, often by imitating them to some extent.

To exemplify how ”the difficulties of radical change spring from what is taken-for-granted in socio-cultural terms and the ways in which the legitimacy of particular ways of organizing become tied to issues of existing logics, power and interests”, the authors mention NASA’s shift towards ”open innovation” by crowdsourcing (citing Chesbrough³⁰, Lakhani et al.³¹, and last but not least Lifshitz-Assaf³²). Lifshitz-Assaf concluded that ”Only R&D professionals who underwent identity refocusing work dismantled their boundaries, truly adopting the knowledge from outside and sharing their internal knowledge”, illustrating ”the critical role of professional identity work in changing knowledge-work boundaries”³³.

Earlier, Selander & Jarvenpaa³⁴ have studied the SMO of SMOs: how Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) have changed their digital action repertoires for Social Media Optimization (SMO). They studied how those changes challenged the existing organization (Amnesty International) and observed a fraction between local team members and digital supporters of the organization, and how senior management and digital media employees tried to bridge that divide.

Of course, digital transformation of organizations is – like the other concepts explored here – not exclusive to intrapreneurship, neither is intrapreneurship necessarily digital. Digital innovations has however ”opened the path for new intrapreneurial opportunities”³⁵ and can be assumed to play a part in many contemporary intrapreneurial ventures, in and outside of the intelligence services.

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Employee deviance in organizations

Intrapreneurial ventures are deviations from organizational comme il faut. If successful, they help their hosts and can be deemed beneficial or constructive. If not, they might be harmful or destructive. This makes Warren’s article very interesting.

Danielle E. Warren³⁶ defined employee deviance as “behavioral departures from norms of a reference group” and noted that it can cause “disastrous consequences for not only organizations but also entire industries and society”, as well as bring about constructive change and help evade organizational failure or societal disaster, in 2003. She stressed the need for three advancements in the field of employee deviance for better scientific debate on the subject:

1. Specify the reference group: Who or what is the behavior studied a deviation from? ”Ultimately, the question ‘Deviant compared to what?’ must be answered”³⁷. The reference group is the social group associated with the formal (e.g. protocol) or informal (e.g. routines) norms from which a deviation is made. Warren hoped that better speficiation can benefit the second point on her wishlist, and also facilitate ”identification of conflicts between norms of multiple reference groups”³⁸.
2. Study a broader concept of deviant behaviours: Most existing literature on employee deviance was focused on either constructive or destructive deviance. According to Warren, this dichotomy is an obstruction towards more integrated contributions to science: ”the behaviors share a fundamental similarity: both require a departure from norms whereby employees must resist social pressure to conform. Further similarities appear in the theories and recommendations prescribed by proponents of the two views of deviance. For example, autonomy plays a role in both views.”³⁹
3. Be explicit about on what normative foundations behavior is judged: Is national security, personnel safety, adherence to the rule of law or something else entirely the primary concern when deviance is evaluated? Warren refutes the idea that all departures from norms are destructive, claiming that ”such logic results in moral relativism, whereby the reference group dictates morality independent of all other outside groups” (a counter argument to this might connect to Matt LeMay’s ”Change the rules, don’t brake the rules”-principle of product management⁴⁰, which I’ll return to in a later post.)
   
   Judging what departures are destructive or constructive (or simply unproductive) requires a clear and detailed position, Warren argues in her third appeal for advancements in the research field. For example: simply saying that illegal behavior is to be deemed destructive overlooks the complexity in firms that operate in many and sometimes conflicting legislations (the same can of course be said for most intelligence services). The argument that societal values should define what constitutes constructive deviance or not faces the same problem: what society’s norms and values should define this? And how are those values agreed upon in the first place?
   
   To facilitate future judgment, Warren suggest using hypernorms, i.e. ”globally held beliefs and values”. In contrast to ”universal norms”, where a person or a group decides what the rest of the world should agree on, hypernorms could be explained as the ”least common denominators” of what all people want and need: food, freedom, and physical security for example.

In essence, these metanorms provide a global standard for evaluating behavior that extends beyond organizational and country-specific boundaries. The appeal of using hypernorms as a standard for judging workplace deviance lies in their inclusiveness and ease of empirical application.

Danielle E. Warren⁴¹

Hypernorms capture more than one normative approach to ethical theory, as they can encompass rights, justice, utilitarianism, duties, and virtue. They can be found by studying international organizations and practices, Warren argues.

By mapping deviance and conformance with both a defined reference group (e.g. an intelligence community) and hypernorms (e.g. human rights), Warren comes up with a four field matrix consisting of constructive and destructive deviance, as well as constructive and destructive conformity:

To me, this is gold. If I was surprised that there wasn’t much research on intrapreneurs as insider threats, I am amazed to not find any research on the relation between intrapreneurship and employee deviance of any sort, let alone on the duality in destructive and constructive deviance in regards to intrapreneurship. A common perspective of insider threat is that of ”counterproductive work behaviors” (CWB) that can be directed against the organization (CWB-O) or fellow individuals in it (CWB-I)⁴². CWB can be defined as ”employee behavior that goes against the legitimate interests of the workplace”⁴³ and one of its dimensions is ”deviance from accepted behavioral norms”⁴⁴.

Oh, and please note that destructive conformity is not the same as malicious compliance (not mentioned by Warren), as the latter describes employees carrying out orders with the knowledge and/or intent that the consequences from their compliance will cause harm to their employer. Destructive conformity might serve the organization perfectly well, but it brakes hypernormative standards (e.g. by severely polluting a river).

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Sub-cultures on the tactical/operative level

Intrapreneurial ventures, and institutional resistance against them, can only be designed and managed to a degree. Other factors might apply in the enactment of organizational floor, what the military calls the tactical level and civilian business calls the operative level. One such factor can be local subcultures.

Ingesson⁴⁵ argues that decisions of lower-level military commanders can have ”major political and strategic impact”, and that these decisions are shaped by ”tactical-level subcultures”. Ingesson suggests that the likelyhood of deviance or conformity can be predicted by measuring how well (or not) such subcultures align with official strategy and policy.

The theory is developed as an alternative to – or perhaps synthesis of – two conflicting views prevailant in describing military dynamics:

1. That the rigid and unique military organization structure limits individual freedom⁴⁶,
2. That the military is shaped by the agency of non-conformant leaders⁴⁷, ”typically described as individualists and innovators”, who are ”ready to defy conventions and break old patterns”.⁴⁸

The apparent clash between the automaton of the ideal type organization and the free agent of the military leader ideal illustrates the problematic dimensions inherent in both ideal types.

Tony Ingesson, The politics of combat (2016)

Ingesson argues that both these perspectives are both problematic and suggests instead to see military leaders on the tactical level as street-level bureaucrats. Street-level bureaucracy is a concept introduced by Lipsky in 1980⁴⁹ where the street-level bureaucrat is defined as ”a public service worker who interacts directly with citizens in the course of his or her job” and through their ”substantial discretion in the execution” and relative autonomy from organizational authority can ”make policy”.

In this manner, political policies with clearly expected results can be altered by the implementation of the street-level bureaucrats in such a manner that the outcome can diverge significantly from the expectations of the political decision-makers

Tony Ingesson, The politics of combat (2016)

Because decision-making in war (fighting hostile, life-threatening adversaries with limited information, time to decide and other resources, but ”an infinity of petty circumstances”⁵⁰ adding friction) is stressful and ”extraordinary difficult” the street-level bureaucrats lean on subcultures, Ingesson argues⁵¹:

A tactical-level subculture is, in essence, a set of cultural norms, ideas and priorities, which are shared by the members of a military unit.

Tony Ingesson, The politics of combat (2016)

An effective tactical-level subculture is coherrent (i.e. straightforward and without inherent contradictions) and agreed upon by its members. This is achieved through focal points such as a role model or tradition: ”When the members of a unit become confused as to how they should act, the focal point provides clarity”⁵². As one example, Ingesson details how Swedish troops in Bosnia, 1993, had a ”a strong heritage of formalized autonomy”⁵³, citing their tactical manual: “Indecisiveness and lack of action usually has more severe implications than if a commander makes a mistake regarding how to proceed”⁵⁴. This helped build a ”Trigger-Happy, Autonomous, and Disobedient” tactical-level subculture that in turn help save civilian lives in spite of complicated and complicating rules of engagement.

Although intrapreneurship is routinely described as a individual activity, cultural factors are studied (e.g. Yun⁵⁵, Hashmi⁵⁶, and Benitez‐Amado⁵⁷), and although most intrapreneurs fortunately aren’t exposed to the atrocities and fog of war, other uncertainties⁵⁸ and stressors might apply. It is also worth noting that Street-level Bureaucracy (1980) and Intrapreneuring (1985) were both written by members of the “lucky few” generation in their late thirties and early forties (Lipsky was born in 1940, and Pinchot in 1942). It would be interesting to study how the times, its progressive politics and booming economy, and the authors’ generational place in it shaped their analyses and descriptions of autonomous, almost defiant, professionals.

Disclosure: One of the original inspiration for this thesis research was Ingesson’s article about the Nordbat 2 mission to Bosnia in the early nineteen-nineties⁵⁹ as I saw it as an potential example of intrapreneurship. (Perhaps because it was shared by an old intrapreneurial sponsor of mine, fond of quoting Grace Hopper. This year, I realized that it was written by one of my teachers, and quite possibly the one who will grade my thesis.

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The ethics of espionage

In trying to do the right things regarding intrapreneurship, most conscientious people will run into ethical dilemmas. The examples given by Warren on Employee Deviance highlights that these questions can be particularly hairy in organizations operating in different or vague jurisdiction. Like an intelligence service for example.

Pfaff & Tiel⁶⁰ tried to help intelligence professionals determine ”when it is appropriate to set aside the usual prohibitions in order to achieve national objectives”. They provided a framework inspired by Kant & Locke to find a balance between ”ethical restraint and intelligence effectiveness”.

They concluded that modern liberal republics are built on the grounds that all persons are created equal, and that acting against this principle ”would be an act of betrayal”⁶¹. They added that although this should constrain the actions of intelligence professionals, they don’t have the same obligations to citizens of other nations as they do to citizens of their own. In seeking what Warren would call hypernorms, Pfaff & Tiel agree that two salient features appear to be critical to human value:
1. Metaphysical freedom: Humans can reflect upon and decide their actions independently.
2. Rationality. Humans can recognize that they are humans among humans, and that we share our freedom for choosing with the other persons we identify as humans.
From this follows the Golden Rule, similar to what Kantians refer to as Categorical Imperative and Lockeans call Natural Rights.

Pfaff & Tiell goes on to argue that in line with there hypernorms, it is ethical to respect humans accordingly ”unless they consent to be constrained by something in addition to these boundaries”, as we must respect other humans’ right to choose for themselves. This logic justifies killing a soldier in the battlefield, as that person ”accepts the training and equipment of a soldier” and not only poses a threat but is a player in the game of war⁶².

Recognizing that people can participate more or less willingly to different degrees in a spy game, Pfaff & Tiell then goes on to sort actors in five categories of ”legitimate targets of espionage” – from the ordinary, uninformed citizen to the informed intelligence professional – specifying what different actions can be justified taking against the different categories of ”players” in the spy game, and why.

The authors recognize the problem of collateral damage: ”intelligence operations directed against legitimate targets might have nonconsensual consequences for illegitimate targets”. Their solution proposed to this problem is the doctrine of double effect, attributed to Christopher (1994)⁶³: that there is ”a moral difference between the consequences of our actions that we intend and those we do not intend, but still foresee”, and that it is permissible to do something good that (also) have bad consequences, given that four conditions are met:

1. Nastiness is not intended,
2. Nastiness is proportional to the good effect’s worth,
3. Nastiness is not a direct means to the good effect and,
4. Nasty effects are mitigated, even at more high-risk expenses.

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Still with me? If you have by any chance read this far, please comment or email me!

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And one last thing: Only after writing this post, I found Elert & Stenkula’s article on Productive and Non-Productive intrapreneurship⁶⁴, which I will return to in a later post.)

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4. Pinchot, G. & Soltanifar, M. (2021) “Digital Intrapreneurship: The Corporate Solution to a Rapid Digitalisation”. In: Soltanifar M., Hughes M., Göcke L. (eds) Digital Entrepreneurship. Future of Business and Finance, Springer, DOI
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21. Elert, N., Henrekson, M. (2016), ”Evasive entrepreneurship”, Small Business Economics, 47, 95–113, DOI
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23. as defined by: Magnusson, J., Koutsikouria, D. & Päivärinta, T., ”Efficiency creep and shadow innovation: enacting ambidextrous IT Governance in the public sector”, European Journal of Information Systems, DOI
24. Pinchot, G. (1985) Intrapreneuring: Why you don’t have to leave the corporation to become an entrepreneur, Harper & Row, ISBN: 0060913355, p. xi, URL
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