{"id":145,"date":"2020-12-17T12:01:27","date_gmt":"2020-12-17T12:01:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/gustavs.se\/intra\/?p=145"},"modified":"2021-01-11T09:46:48","modified_gmt":"2021-01-11T09:46:48","slug":"nine-perspectives-on-the-intrapreneur-as-an-insider-threat","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/gustavs.se\/intra\/nine-perspectives-on-the-intrapreneur-as-an-insider-threat\/","title":{"rendered":"Nine perspectives on the intrapreneur as an insider threat"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Risk is acknowledged as a salient or even inherent feature of innovation and exploration in organizations<\/span>1<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/span>2<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/span>3<\/sup><\/a><\/span>. However, the risks\u2019 nature and consequences are often less explored than other features of intrapreneurship and intra-organizational innovation.

In fact, my main reason for starting this blog is to find more research on the risks involved in intrapreneurship and how they can be understood.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Below, I have compiled nine different conceptual frameworks \u2013 or perspectives \u2013 that might facilitate the understanding of the intrapreneur as an insider threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Before we proceed, I would like to define the two most central terms:
Insider threat: <\/strong>\u201dSomeone who, through authorized access to an organization\u2019s resources, has the potential to negatively affect the organization, its purpose and\/or its stakeholders, and risk doing so.\u201d<\/em>
Intrapreneurs:<\/strong> \u201dPeople who use their entrepreneurial spirit for the benefit of their employers, and whilst supported by sponsors higher up in their organization also tend to evade their organizations’ control systems and\/or resource management to achieve their missions.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, to be clear, insider threats \u2013 in my definition \u2013 need not be harmful or malicious to pose a threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Also, as this is part of my thesis work in intelligence analysis<\/a>, I am particularly interested in how these questions apply to the intelligence services in general and more specifically to the U.S. intelligence community (USIC). Later, I’ll explore Intellipedia<\/a> as a typical case of intrapreneurship in this context.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Before and after each presentation of a perspective, you’ll see my personal comments on how this perspective relate to the question of intrapreneurs in a grey box.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As a short guide to the nine perspectives, here are a short summary:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Personal risk vs. organizational risk<\/a> <\/strong>
Here, four potential approaches to risks in intrapreneurial ventures are explored.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Negative spillover: Brain drain<\/strong> <\/a>
This was the only negative spillover from intrapreneurship that I could find any elaborate research on: how intrapreneurs might be recruited by competing organizations, how that risk might be mitigated legally and the potential consequences of such legal measures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Information security \u2013 a compromise<\/strong> <\/a>
As I investigate the USIC and the intelligence sharing platform Intellipedia, this is a central question. However, I would argue that the perspective offered here is applicable to most intrapreneurial ventures, even if the relevance is particularly strong for intelligence services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ambidextrous organizations and shadow innovation<\/a><\/strong>
The balance between exploration (innovation) and exploitation in organization can be described as an ambidextrous act. In this section, I describe how recent findings suggest that the balance is not (entirely) in the two hands of upper management but enacted through shadow innovation (exploration) and efficiency creep (exploitation) in lower levels of the organization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Evasive entrepreneurship<\/a><\/strong>
I suggest some parallells between the concepts of (threatening) evasive entrepreneurship and shadow innovation or \u201dintrapreneurship after dark\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Transformational intrapreneurship<\/a>
<\/strong>Intrapreneuring might be regarded as an existential threat by incumbent players in an organization if its effects are transformational. In studying how adoption of digital tools transforms organizations (and how organizations transform to enable such tools), such a threat perception might be better understood.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Employee Deviance in organizations<\/a>
<\/strong>Intrapreneuring are more or less \u201dbehavioral departures from norms of a reference group\u201d, a definition of employee deviance. This, in turn, is more or less the definition of the insider threat of \u201dcounterproductive work behaviors\u201d (CWB). Here, a way to distinguish between constructive and destructive deviance is offered.

Tactical-level subcultures<\/a><\/strong>
Intrapreneurial behaviour in war \u2013 i.e. deviations from rules of engagement or other protocol to achieve a tactical advantages \u2013 is explained as a form of street-level bureaucracy depending on tactical-level subcultures. This concept might also be applicable under less chaotic circumstances than the fog of war.

Ethics of Espionage<\/a><\/strong>
Finally, some industry-specific deliberations on right and wrong are considered for guidance on how to assess whether intrapreneurial transgressions are justified or not.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Personal risk vs. organizational risk<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Intrapreneurship is pitched to employees \u201das a way to capture the creativity and excitement of entrepreneurship, albeit with more resources and less risk\u201d<\/span>4<\/sup><\/a><\/span>. <\/em>But are intrapreneurs really less prone to put themselves at risk than their organization and its assets, or more so compared to entrepreneurs? Whilst this study fails to answer that question, it does contribute with several useful ways to understand and explain intrapreneurships relations to risk.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recognizing that risk is \u201dan inherent characteristic of innovativeness\u201d<\/span>5<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, Bostjan Antoncic<\/strong><\/a> \u2013 a prolific publisher<\/a> of research on intrapreneuring \u2013 investigated Risk taking in intrapreneurship: Translating the individual level risk aversion into the organizational risk taking<\/em><\/a> (2003). He proposed a method for examining his question \u201dhow is it possible that risk averse individuals act in such a way that an organization exercises risk taking behavior in terms of intrapreneurship\u201d based on four \u201dcongruent and complementary”<\/span>6<\/sup><\/a><\/span> theories around information processing (and excisting intrapreneurship literature):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

  1. Theory of planned behavior<\/a>:<\/strong> Individuals base their decisions on salient beliefs.<\/li>
  2. Prospect theory<\/a>: <\/strong>Individuals base their decisions on perceptions of information.<\/li>
  3. Agency theory<\/a>: <\/strong>Individuals base their decisions on information availability related to financial relationships in their organizations.<\/li>
  4. Organizational culture perspective<\/a>: <\/strong>Individuals base their decisions on information availability related to non-financial relationships in their organizations.<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    Antoncic concluded that his model shows that:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    risk taking propensity as a general enduring psychological characteristic tends not to impact context specific risk-related cognitions and behaviours<\/em><\/p>Bostjan Antoncic, \u201dRisk taking in intrapreneurship: Translating the individual level risk aversion into the organizational risk taking\u201d<\/span>7<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

    In essence, a careful person needn’t be careful in all situations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Antoncic opens for the possibility that the premise for his article is not to be found: \u201dA radical conclusion [\u2026] might be that the risk paradox does not exist, since it apparently disappeared through the conceptual analysis”<\/em>, but suggests the “more moderate explanation, that seems more plausible\u201d<\/em> that there is indeed a paradox, but that it doesn’t disturbe or harm organizational life or performance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Antoncic recognizes that his approach (as its underlying theories) stipulate that individuals are \u201drelatively rational decision-makers in bounds of available information that shapes their cognitions and in turn their behaviours\u201d<\/span>8<\/sup><\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The question of organizational risk vs. personal risk is very interesting from an insider threat-perspective. However, the premise of this thesis might not that relevant to study the insider threat-perspective. Whether or not there is, generally, a paradox between organizational risk taking propensity and personal risk aversion is – to me – less relevant than the perception of organizational risk taking. However, as Antoncic notes, one can argue that \u201drisk taking behavior basically resides at the level of an individual even if it is finally translated into the firm’s risk taking behavior\u201d<\/em>. The fact that the paradox does not seem to be \u201ddisturbing and harmful for organizational life and performance\u201d<\/em> might, if it stands, suggest that is doesn’t matter that much.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    Negative spillover: Brain drain<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    Since this is the only example I have found that explicitly adresses a threat from intrapreneurship, this contribution a given item on my list of concepts and conceptual frameworks:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Law Professor Mirit Eyal-Cohen<\/a><\/strong><\/span>9<\/sup><\/a><\/span> has explored the negative spillovers of intrapreneurial activities by “Innovation Agents<\/a>“. She identified the loss of intrapreneurial talent and intellectual property either to incumbent competitors or new ventures, and the subsequent restrictive and wasteful arrangements to mitigate such risks, as potential negative spillovers of intrapreneurial firms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    This perspective is perhaps most interesting from a recruitment opportunity perspective for intelligence services. Apart from the threat of loosing resources like competence when employees leave an organization, an embittered intrapreneur could perhaps be recruited to a competing organization or state. To a host organization, managing expectations, needs and failures of intrapreneurs could be a matter of security. To a competing actor, areas of conflict around failed or threatening intrapreneurial ventures might present opportunities. Also, the fact that Bulmash & Winokur<\/span>10<\/sup><\/a><\/span> didn’t mention Eyal-Cohen in their article, might serve as proof that the research field of intrapreneurship is still fragmented. Bulmash & Winokur linked intrapreneurship opportunities with employers to lower employee turnover intention<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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    Information Security – a compromise<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

    Information security is one feature of the U.S. Intelligence Community identified as competing with intrapreneurial endeavours. It is specifically relevant to the Intellipedia case as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Javorsek et al.<\/span>11<\/sup><\/a><\/span> recognized that \u201dthe scientific advantage upon which U.S. military dominance relies\u201d is threatened by the costs of compartmentalization. Javorsek et al.<\/span>12<\/sup><\/a><\/span> identifies four major repercussions with \u201dover-compartmentalization\u201d of knowledge:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    1. Intelligence consumers must rely on sub-optimal intelligence products for foreign policy decisions, as analysts are denied access to compartmented information.<\/li>
    2. Resources are wasted on parallel but independent development projects.<\/li>
    3. It limits the collective intellectual ability for problem solving.<\/li>
    4. It inhibits communication between the tactical and strategic level, preventing effective knowledge sharing during development and employment.  <\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

      Quoting Kitrosser<\/span>13<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, Javorsek et al. recognizes that \u201dsecurity compartmentalization has both costs and associated benefits”. The candor argument brought forward by Kitrosser<\/span>14<\/sup><\/a><\/span> \u2013 that secrecy can further openness since \u201dcandor may more likely emerge in a closed, confidential conversation than in a public one\u201d \u2013 is seemingly ignored by Javorsek et al. when they conclude that compartmentalization equals \u201dincreasing costs in research and development\u201d<\/span>15<\/sup><\/a><\/span>. It\u2019s worth noting that Kitrosser\u2019s article addresses congressional oversight of national security activities, and not intra-organzational development per se. One might assume that Javorsek et al. considers the candor-argument less applicable to technological R&D than intelligence analysis and intelligence operations, the fact that increased psychological safety affects team learning behavior<\/span>16<\/sup><\/a><\/span> aside. Kitrosser also concludes that \u201dThe purpose and utility of funneling have been under-explored, and funneling’s propriety and implications thus are poorly understood.\u201d<\/span>17<\/sup><\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The conflict between information sharing and information security is old but accentuated by digitalization. In the case of Intellipedia, it’s been central. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

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      Shadow innovation – intrapreneuring after dark<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

      In defining an insider threat as someone who, through authorized access to an organization\u2019s resources, has the potential to negatively affect that organization, its purpose and\/or its stakeholders (and risk doing so), I want to highlight that a conflict about scarce resources may not only be a competition for the use of such resources, but also a conflict around the consequences of using them. The conceptual framework around \u201dAmbidextrous organizations\u201d and particularly the concepts of \u201defficiency creep\u201d and \u201dshadow innovation\u201d can be useful to understand the integration of information security, and information resource management\/enactment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Since the early 1990s, one popular approach to study and describe the balance between innovation and efficiency within organizations has been the notion of \u201dAmbidextrous organizations\u201d: where exploration<\/em> is handled with one hand and exploitation<\/em> with the other. March<\/span>18<\/sup><\/a><\/span> concluded that \u201d<\/em>Both exploration and exploitation are essential for organizations, but they compete for scarce resources\u201d. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

      More recently, Magnusson, Koutsikouria & P\u00e4iv\u00e4rinta<\/span>19<\/sup><\/a><\/span> found in studying IT governance in the Swedish Tax Authority (Skatteverket) a \u201dsubstantial misalignment of the tactical vs. the strategic and operative layers\u201d. Whereas the strategic intent and the actual outcome aligned fairly well, project goals set by middle management all but eradicated exploration in favour of exploitation.The authors explained this as enactment<\/em> (rather than management or design) of ambidextrous IT Governance, where \u201defficiency creep\u201d in the middle layer is balanced by \u201dshadow innovation\u201d in the bottom layer in the organization\u2019s hierarchy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      This could indicate that there is indeed need for exploration intent to \u201dgo through the \u2018clay layer\u2019 of middle managers who are usually driven so hard to achieve short-term goals in established systems that they have no time for new ideas\u201d, as Pinchot & Soltanifar suggests<\/span>20<\/sup><\/a><\/span>.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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      Evasive entrepreneurship<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

      A related field of research is that of evasive entrepreneurship. This pertains to companies’ relations to societies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      We define evasive entrepreneurship as profit-driven business activity in the market aimed at circumventing the existing institutional framework by using innovations to exploit contradictions in that framework.<\/p>Niklas Elert & Magnus Henrekson<\/span>21<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

      (A complementary definition, one that I joted down and now can’t find the source of, is \u201dit’s when a company circumvents a society’s institutional framework (by exploiting regulatory vacuum, vagueness or incompetence) in order to achieve its goals.\u201d<\/em>)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Giving a number of examples, Elert & Henrekson concludes that while evasive entrepreneurship can be either productive, unproductive or destructive, it can also challenge status quo through disruption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Just this April, US libertarian think tank Cato Institute published a paperback in praise of evasive entrepreneurship<\/a>, but these thoughts aren’t new \u2013 overt evasion has been labeled and studied as corporate disobedience<\/a><\/span>22<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, for example.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      As observations and findings on evasive intrapreneurship or corporate civil disobedience might, at least in some cases, translate to intrapreneurs’ relations to their organizations, this could be a rewarding field to explore for someone interested in intrapreneurial shadow innovation(i.e. unsanctioned innovation activities<\/span>23<\/sup><\/a><\/span>). One can be tempted to use a term like \u201dEvasive intrapreneurship\u201d to describe shadow innovation. That might be a tautology though. Pinchot, who coined the term intrapreneur, recognized that intrapreneurs \u201droutinely bootleg company resources or ‘steal’ company time to work on their own missions\u201d<\/span>24<\/sup><\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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      Transformational intrapreneurship<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

      This conceptual framework can help understand the effects of intrapreneurship, and how a digital intrapreneurial venture can threaten existing organizational life. Digital transformation is particularly relevant in contemporary research of intelligence services as \u201dIt is only a small exaggeration to say that software has eaten just about everything in the [U.S. intelligence community]\u201d<\/span>25<\/sup><\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Hinings, Gegenhuber & Greenwood<\/span>26<\/sup><\/a><\/span> recognizes that digital transformation \u2013 \u201dthe combined effects of several digital innovations bringing about novel actors (and actor constellations), structures, practices, values, and beliefs\u201d \u2013 can threaten the existing \u201drules of the game\u201d in and for organizations. However, they also question the idea of total disruption, and suggest that existing literature on institutional change rather suggests that if and how new arrangements are accepted depend on already existing institutional arrangements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Hinings, Gegenhuber & Greenwood, in citing Bitektine<\/span>27<\/sup><\/a><\/span> and Suchman<\/span>28<\/sup><\/a><\/span> among others, recognizes that both accommodation marketplace Airbnb and crowdsourcing platform GalaxyZoo (now Zoouniverse) were accepted by existing institutions because they were developed and promoted \u201dusing language that aligned them with […] organizations\/industries that already had legitimacy\u201d<\/span>29<\/sup><\/a><\/span>. They propose that radical digital transformers, to be successful, seek legitimacy through and in the institutions that they challenge, often by imitating them to some extent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      To exemplify how \u201dthe difficulties of radical change spring from what is taken-for-granted in socio-cultural terms and the ways in which the legitimacy of particular ways of organizing become tied to issues of existing logics, power and interests<\/em>\u201d, the authors mention NASA’s shift towards \u201dopen innovation\u201d by crowdsourcing (citing Chesbrough<\/span>30<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, Lakhani et al.<\/span>31<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, and last but not least Lifshitz-Assaf<\/span>32<\/sup><\/a><\/span>). Lifshitz-Assaf concluded that \u201dOnly R&D professionals who underwent identity refocusing work dismantled their boundaries, truly adopting the knowledge from outside and sharing their internal knowledge<\/em>\u201d, illustrating \u201dthe critical role of professional identity work in changing knowledge-work boundaries<\/em>\u201d<\/span>33<\/sup><\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Earlier, Selander & Jarvenpaa<\/span>34<\/sup><\/a><\/span> have studied the SMO of SMOs<\/em>: how Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) have changed their digital action repertoires for Social Media Optimization (SMO). They studied how those changes challenged the existing organization (Amnesty International) and observed a fraction between local team members and digital supporters of the organization, and how senior management and digital media employees tried to bridge that divide.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Of course, digital transformation of organizations is – like the other concepts explored here \u2013 not exclusive to intrapreneurship, neither is intrapreneurship necessarily digital. Digital innovations has however \u201dopened the path for new intrapreneurial opportunities\u201d<\/em><\/span>35<\/sup><\/a><\/span> <\/em>and can be assumed to play a part in many contemporary intrapreneurial ventures, in and outside of the intelligence services.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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      Employee deviance in organizations<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

      Intrapreneurial ventures are deviations from organizational comme il faut. If successful, they help their hosts and can be deemed beneficial or constructive. If not, they might be harmful or destructive. This makes Warren’s article very interesting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Danielle E. Warren<\/span>36<\/sup><\/a><\/span> defined employee deviance as “behavioral departures from norms of a reference group” and noted that it can cause “disastrous consequences for not only organizations but also entire industries and society\u201d, as well as bring about constructive change and help evade organizational failure or societal disaster, in 2003. She stressed the need for three advancements in the field of employee deviance for better scientific debate on the subject:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      1. Specify the reference group: <\/strong>Who or what is the behavior studied a deviation from? \u201dUltimately, the question ‘Deviant compared to what?’ must be answered\u201d<\/span>37<\/sup><\/a><\/span>. The reference group<\/em> is the social group associated with the formal (e.g. protocol) or informal (e.g. routines) norms from which a deviation is made. Warren hoped that better speficiation can benefit the second point on her wishlist, and also facilitate \u201didentification of conflicts between norms of multiple reference groups\u201d<\/span>38<\/sup><\/a><\/span>.<\/li>
      2. Study a broader concept of deviant behaviours<\/strong>: Most existing literature on employee deviance was focused on either<\/em> constructive or<\/em> destructive deviance. According to Warren, this dichotomy is an obstruction towards more integrated contributions to science: \u201dthe behaviors share a fundamental similarity: both require a departure from norms whereby employees must resist social pressure to conform. Further similarities appear in the theories and recommendations prescribed by proponents of the two views of deviance. For example, autonomy plays a role in both views.\u201d<\/em><\/span>39<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/li>
      3. Be explicit about on what normative foundations behavior is judged<\/strong>: Is national security, personnel safety, adherence to the rule of law or something else entirely the primary concern when deviance is evaluated? Warren refutes the idea that all departures from norms are destructive, claiming that \u201dsuch logic results in moral relativism, whereby the reference group dictates morality independent of all other outside groups\u201d (a counter argument to this might connect to Matt LeMay’s \u201dChange the rules, don’t brake the rules\u201d<\/em>-principle of product management<\/span>40<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, which I’ll return to in a later post.)

        Judging what departures are destructive or constructive (or simply unproductive) requires a clear and detailed position, Warren argues in her third appeal for advancements in the research field. For example: simply saying that illegal behavior is to be deemed destructive overlooks the complexity in firms that operate in many and sometimes conflicting legislations (the same can of course be said for most intelligence services). The argument that societal values should define what constitutes constructive deviance or not faces the same problem: what society’s norms and values should define this? And how are those values agreed upon in the first place?

        To facilitate future judgment, Warren suggest using hypernorms, i.e. \u201dglobally held beliefs and values\u201d. In contrast to \u201duniversal norms\u201d, where a person or a group decides what the rest of the world should agree on, hypernorms could be explained as the \u201dleast common denominators\u201d of what all people want and need: food, freedom, and physical security for example.<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

        In essence, these metanorms provide a global standard for evaluating behavior that extends beyond organizational and country-specific boundaries. The appeal of using hypernorms as a standard for judging workplace deviance lies in their inclusiveness and ease of empirical application.<\/p>Danielle E. Warren<\/span>41<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

        Hypernorms capture more than one normative approach to ethical theory, as they can encompass rights, justice, utilitarianism, duties, and virtue. They can be found by studying international organizations and practices, Warren argues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        By mapping deviance and conformance with both a defined reference group (e.g. an intelligence community) and hypernorms (e.g. human rights), Warren comes up with a four field matrix consisting of constructive and destructive deviance, as well as constructive and destructive conformity:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        \"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

        To me, this is gold. If I was surprised that there wasn’t much research on intrapreneurs as insider threats, I am amazed to not find any research on the relation between intrapreneurship and employee deviance of any sort, let alone on the duality in destructive and constructive deviance in regards to intrapreneurship. A common perspective of insider threat is that of \u201dcounterproductive work behaviors\u201d (CWB) that can be directed against the organization (CWB-O) or fellow individuals in it (CWB-I)<\/span>42<\/sup><\/a><\/span>. <\/em>CWB can be defined as \u201demployee behavior that goes against the legitimate interests of the workplace\u201d<\/span>43<\/sup><\/a><\/span> <\/em>and one of its dimensions is \u201ddeviance from accepted behavioral norms\u201d<\/span>44<\/sup><\/a><\/span>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

        Oh, and please note that destructive conformity is not the same as malicious compliance<\/a> (not mentioned by Warren), as the latter describes employees carrying out orders with the knowledge and\/or intent that the consequences from their compliance will cause harm to their employer. Destructive conformity might serve the organization perfectly well, but it brakes hypernormative standards (e.g. by severely polluting a river).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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        Sub-cultures on the tactical\/operative level<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

        Intrapreneurial ventures, and institutional resistance against them, can only be designed and managed to a degree. Other factors might apply in the enactment of organizational floor, what the military calls the tactical level and civilian business calls the operative level. One such factor can be local subcultures.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        Ingesson<\/span>45<\/sup><\/a><\/span> argues that decisions of lower-level military commanders can have \u201dmajor political and strategic impact\u201d, and that these decisions are shaped by \u201dtactical-level subcultures\u201d. Ingesson suggests that the likelyhood of deviance or conformity can be predicted by measuring how well (or not) such subcultures align with official strategy and policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        The theory is developed as an alternative to \u2013 or perhaps synthesis of \u2013 two conflicting views prevailant in describing military dynamics:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

        1. That the rigid and unique military organization structure limits individual freedom<\/span>46<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, <\/li>
        2. That the military is shaped by the agency of non-conformant leaders<\/span>47<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, \u201dtypically described as individualists and innovators\u201d, who are \u201dready to defy conventions and break old patterns\u201d.<\/span>48<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n

          The apparent clash between the automaton of the ideal type organization and the free agent of the military leader ideal illustrates the problematic dimensions inherent in both ideal types.<\/em><\/p>Tony Ingesson, The politics of combat<\/a> (2016)<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

          Ingesson argues that both these perspectives are both problematic and suggests instead to see military leaders on the tactical level as street-level bureaucrats. Street-level bureaucracy<\/a> is a concept introduced by Lipsky in 1980<\/span>49<\/sup><\/a><\/span> where the street-level bureaucrat is defined as \u201da public service worker who interacts directly with citizens in the course of his or her job\u201d and through their \u201dsubstantial discretion in the execution\u201d and relative autonomy from organizational authority can \u201dmake policy\u201d.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          In this manner, political policies with clearly expected results can be altered by the implementation of the street-level bureaucrats in such a manner that the outcome can diverge significantly from the expectations of the political decision-makers<\/em><\/p>Tony Ingesson, The politics of combat<\/a> (2016)<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

          Because decision-making in war (fighting hostile, life-threatening adversaries with limited information, time to decide and other resources, but \u201dan infinity of petty circumstances\u201d<\/span>50<\/sup><\/a><\/span> adding friction) is stressful and \u201dextraordinary difficult\u201d the street-level bureaucrats lean on subcultures, Ingesson argues<\/span>51<\/sup><\/a><\/span>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          A tactical-level subculture is, in essence, a set of cultural norms, ideas and priorities, which are shared by the members of a military unit.<\/em><\/p>Tony Ingesson, The politics of combat<\/a> (2016) <\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

          An effective tactical-level subculture is coherrent (i.e. straightforward and without inherent contradictions) and agreed upon by its members. This is achieved through focal points<\/em> such as a role model or tradition: \u201dWhen the members of a unit become confused as to how they should act, the focal point provides clarity\u201d<\/span>52<\/sup><\/a><\/span>. As one example, Ingesson details how Swedish troops in Bosnia, 1993, had a \u201da strong heritage of formalized autonomy\u201d<\/span>53<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, citing their tactical manual: \u201cIndecisiveness and lack of action usually has more severe implications than if a commander makes a mistake regarding how to proceed\u201d<\/em><\/span>54<\/sup><\/a><\/span>. This helped build a \u201dTrigger-Happy, Autonomous, and Disobedient<\/a>\u201d tactical-level subculture that in turn help save civilian lives in spite of complicated and complicating rules of engagement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Although intrapreneurship is routinely described as a individual activity, cultural factors are studied (e.g. Yun<\/span>55<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, Hashmi<\/span>56<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, and Benitez\u2010Amado<\/span>57<\/sup><\/a><\/span>), and although most intrapreneurs fortunately aren’t exposed to the atrocities and fog of war, other uncertainties<\/span>58<\/sup><\/a><\/span> and stressors might apply. It is also worth noting that Street-level Bureaucracy (1980<\/a>) and Intrapreneuring (1985<\/a>) were both written by members of the “lucky few\u201d<\/a> generation in their late thirties and early forties (Lipsky was born in 1940, and Pinchot in 1942). It would be interesting to study how the times, its progressive politics and booming economy, and the authors’ generational place in it shaped their analyses and descriptions of autonomous, almost defiant, professionals. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Disclosure: One of the original inspiration for this thesis research was Ingesson’s article about the Nordbat 2 mission to Bosnia<\/a> in the early nineteen-nineties<\/span>59<\/sup><\/a><\/span> as I saw it as an potential example of intrapreneurship. (Perhaps because it was shared by an old intrapreneurial sponsor of mine, fond of quoting Grace Hopper<\/a>. This year, I realized that it was written by one of my teachers, and quite possibly the one who will grade my thesis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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          The ethics of espionage<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

          In trying to do the right things regarding intrapreneurship, most conscientious people will run into ethical dilemmas. The examples given by Warren on Employee Deviance highlights that these questions can be particularly hairy in organizations operating in different or vague jurisdiction. Like an intelligence service for example.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Pfaff & Tiel<\/span>60<\/sup><\/a><\/span> tried to help intelligence professionals determine \u201dwhen it is appropriate to set aside the usual prohibitions in order to achieve national objectives\u201d<\/em>. They provided a framework inspired by Kant & Locke to find a balance between \u201dethical restraint and intelligence effectiveness\u201d<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          They concluded that modern liberal republics are built on the grounds that all persons are created equal, and that acting against this principle \u201dwould be an act of betrayal\u201d<\/span>61<\/sup><\/a><\/span>. They added that although this should constrain the actions of intelligence professionals, they don’t have the same obligations to citizens of other nations as they do to citizens of their own. In seeking what Warren would call hypernorms, Pfaff & Tiel agree that two salient features appear to be critical to human value:
          1. Metaphysical freedom: <\/strong>Humans can reflect upon and decide their actions independently.
          2. Rationality. <\/strong>Humans can recognize that they are humans among humans, and that we share our freedom for choosing with the other persons we identify as humans.
          From this follows the           Golden Rule<\/a>, similar to what Kantians refer to as Categorical Imperative<\/a> and Lockeans call Natural Rights<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Pfaff & Tiell goes on to argue that in line with there hypernorms, it is ethical to respect humans accordingly \u201dunless<\/em> they consent to be constrained by something in addition to these boundaries\u201d, as we must respect other humans’ right to choose for themselves. This logic justifies killing a soldier in the battlefield, as that person \u201daccepts the training and equipment of a soldier\u201d and not only poses a threat but is a player in the game of war<\/span>62<\/sup><\/a><\/span>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Recognizing that people can participate more or less willingly to different degrees in a spy game, Pfaff & Tiell then goes on to sort actors in five categories of \u201dlegitimate targets of espionage\u201d \u2013 from the ordinary, uninformed citizen to the informed intelligence professional \u2013 specifying what different actions can be justified taking against the different categories of \u201dplayers\u201d in the spy game, and why.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          The authors recognize the problem of collateral damage: \u201dintelligence operations directed against legitimate targets might have nonconsensual consequences for illegitimate targets\u201d. Their solution proposed to this problem is the doctrine of double effect<\/strong>, attributed to Christopher (1994)<\/span>63<\/sup><\/a><\/span>: that there is \u201da moral difference between the consequences of our actions that we intend and those we do not intend, but still foresee\u201d, and that it is permissible to do something good that (also) have bad consequences, given that four conditions are met:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          1. Nastiness is not intended,<\/li>
          2. Nastiness is proportional to the good effect’s worth,<\/li>
          3. Nastiness is not a direct means to the good effect and,<\/li>
          4. Nasty effects are mitigated, even at more high-risk expenses.<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n
            \n
            \n
            \n
            \n
            \n

            The doctrine of double effect could help in assessing intrapreneurial transgressions, such as unsanctioned risk taking, midnight resource allocation, or other evasive innovation activities. It also relates to the concepts of acceptable loss<\/strong> and acceptable risk<\/strong>, all too present and pressing in today’s debate on Coronavirus<\/a>.

            The doctrine of double effect might also give perfectly well-intentioned people reason to \u2013 knowingly and deliberately \u2013 cause harm.

            Also, I am not suggesting that official or popular judgement on intrapreneurial transgressions will ever be made solely on moral grounds (practicalities and politics apply).

            Pfaff & Tiell published their article in 2004, as western intelligence professionals were involved in very controversial activities during the \u201d            War on Terror<\/a>\u201d, after Al-Qaeda’s attack on U.S. civilian and military targets in September 11, 2001. Although the timing might put their proposal in an unfavourable light, it’s worth to consider their contribution.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

            \u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013\u2013<\/p>\n\n\n\n

            Still with me? If you have by any chance read this far, please comment<\/strong><\/a> or email<\/a> <\/strong>me!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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            And one last thing: Only after writing this post, I found Elert & Stenkula’s article on Productive and Non-Productive intrapreneurship<\/span>64<\/sup><\/a><\/span>, which I will return to in a later post.)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

            Risk is acknowledged as a salient or even inherent feature of innovation and exploration in organizations. However, the risks\u2019 nature and consequences are often less explored than other features of intrapreneurship and intra-organizational innovation. In fact, my main reason for starting this blog is to find more research on the risks involved in intrapreneurship and […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":173,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[6],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/gustavs.se\/intra\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/145"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/gustavs.se\/intra\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/gustavs.se\/intra\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gustavs.se\/intra\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gustavs.se\/intra\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=145"}],"version-history":[{"count":46,"href":"https:\/\/gustavs.se\/intra\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/145\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":291,"href":"https:\/\/gustavs.se\/intra\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/145\/revisions\/291"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gustavs.se\/intra\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/173"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/gustavs.se\/intra\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=145"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gustavs.se\/intra\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=145"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/gustavs.se\/intra\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=145"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}